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THE CENTRE FOR TAX SYSTEM INTEGRITY 
WORKING PAPERS 
 
The Centre for Tax System Integrity (CTSI) is a specialised research unit set up as a 
partnership between the Australian National University (ANU) and the Australian Taxation 
Office (Tax Office) to extend our understanding of how and why cooperation and 
contestation occur within the tax system.  
 
This series of working papers is designed to bring the research of the Centre for Tax System 
Integrity to as wide an audience as possible and to promote discussion among researchers, 
academics and practitioners both nationally and internationally on taxation compliance. 
 
The working papers are selected with three criteria in mind: (1) to share knowledge, 
experience and preliminary findings from research projects; (2) to provide an outlet for 
policy focused research and discussion papers; and (3) to give ready access to previews of 
papers destined for publication in academic journals, edited collections, or research 
monographs. 
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Abstract 
This paper explores the relationship between culturally mediated narratives of fairness, 
conceptions of the state, group and individual identities, citizenship and debates about 
globalisation in Australian perspectives on tax administration. It is based on a qualitative 
analysis of 2 326 responses to a survey of attitudes to the Australian tax system. This paper 
emphasises that taxpayers’ statements can be read as cultural acts that enrich our 
understanding of how people give meaning and significance to their lives. The majority of 
respondents reported that taxation should be levied fairly across social groups. However, 
this sense of fairness is being eroded by the widespread perception that the wealthy are 
avoiding their ‘fair share’ of taxes. Although citizens view tax administration as 
increasingly unfair, there is no evidence of wholesale disengagement from the system. The 
majority of people believe that the tax system has legitimacy and that it can be reformed. 
There is still scope for policy innovation that reinstates a sense of fairness, equity and 
balance to the tax system. 
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Cultural narratives of taxation and citizenship: Fairness, groups and globalisation 
Gregory Rawlings  
 
… I believe I should render unto the Government, via the Tax Office, a portion of 
my income to help run the country.  
… taxes should be paid to the Tax Office without hesitation. Taxes and Death are 
facts of life (The views of two anonymous Australian taxpayers in 2001 responding 
to the survey The Australian Tax System, Fair or Not?) 
 
… who was it who said there were only two things that were certain in life – death 
and taxes? Well the former may be true, but I definitely don’t believe the taxes bit. 
It is one’s God given right to try and minimise your taxes that the government 
wants to take from you (An offshore funds manager in a Pacific Island ‘Tax Haven’ 
catering to the world’s High Wealth Individuals in an interview with the author). 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper argues that narratives of taxation that focus on discourses of fairness are closely 
related to a prevailing egalitarian ethos in Australian society. Narrated notions of fairness 
emphasise equity between groups, call for active citizenship and highlight social 
cooperation just as much as individual competition. These views on the politics of fairness 
are reflected in practices, attitudes and discourses surrounding taxation. Moreover, these 
discourses and practices can be conceptualised as statements of cultural action. 
 
The qualitative, or self-narrative, responses of a survey carried out by the Centre for Tax 
System Integrity (CTSI) in 2002 illustrate a widespread public consensus that taxation is a 
legitimate way of raising government revenue. However, it should be levied and uplifted in 
a manner that is fair and just across all social groups, institutions and organisations. 
Taxation should be independent of sectoral interests. However, this sense of fairness is 
being jeopardised by the widespread view that the wealthy are not paying a proportionately 
just amount of tax. In other words there is a perception that High Wealth Individuals 
(HWIs) and large corporations (both Australian based and multinational) are not paying 
their ‘fair share’ of tax (Braithwaite, 2003). Consequently trust, which is vital for 
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maintaining institutional legitimacy and plays a fundamental role in maintaining and 
legitimising state power (with positive outcomes for compliance), is being adversely 
affected by the perception that taxation is increasingly ‘unfair’.  
 
This perception of unfairness has the potential to undermine the integrity and long-term 
viability of the tax system. It also illustrates some of the structural contradictions and 
tensions of globalisation, namely that the state is failing as an arbitrator of social justice 
guaranteeing a symmetrically reciprocal relationship between citizens and institutions of 
governance. Instead the state is in danger of being perceived as an entity that serves a 
powerful economic elite whose interest’s lie in transnational processes and accords at the 
expense of an increasingly variegated citizenry. This has the capacity to not only pose 
fundamental challenges to institutions such as the Australian Taxation Office (Tax Office) 
who are required to manage taxation obligations for our community but also undermines 
the very fabric of our representative democracy. 
 
Qualitative implications, methodological foundations and narratives of taxation 
 
In 2002, CTSI at the Australian National University (ANU) conducted The Australian Tax 
System – Fair or Not – You Be the Judge: A Survey of Attitudes and Experiences. This was 
sent out to 6 944 people, 3 000 who were randomly chosen from open electoral rolls and   
3 944 who had previously participated in CTSI’s Community Hopes, Fears and Actions 
Survey (CHFA), carried out in 2000 (Braithwaite, 2001; Braithwaite, Reinhart, Mearns 
&Graham, 2001; Braithwaite & Mearns, 2001). Of the 6 944 people who were contacted,  
2 326 completed and returned the survey, representing a response rate of 33.5%. The 
survey was primarily designed to elicit quantitative data, but three open-ended questions 
inviting participants to express their thoughts, feelings, attitudes, perceptions and tax-
paying practices were included at the end of the survey. These questions primarily 
concerned their relationship with the Tax Office, but opened up the possibility for people 
to express specific and general views apropos taxation, the government, expenditure and 
related social issues. In addition to these direct questions, participants were also invited to 
provide any other comments that they wished to make regarding the survey, its content, 
and other issues related to taxation. 
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These three questions and the invitation to open commentary were as follows: In your own 
words, what do you expect the Tax Office to deliver (a) to you? (b) to the Australian 
Community? and (c) in your own words, what is your responsibility to the Tax Office? 
Participants were also asked at the end of these three questions ‘If you have any comments 
which you would like to add, please write them below’. The response rate to this section 
provided a rich source of qualitative material, which can be read as voices embedded in 
text, constituting narratives, or stories that reflect on contestation and cooperation within 
the tax system. This paper is primarily concerned with these responses, and how they 
reflect on the way people are integrated in relations of citizenship with one another through 
institutional procedures.  
 
These responses provided the data for this paper. It was imported into a qualitative data-
analysis software package, QSR NUD*IST Vivo (Nvivo) (Fraser, 2000; Richards, 2000). 
This allowed responses to be systematically searched and coded for key themes in tax 
administration as they were identified by respondents, including fairness, justice, equity, 
honesty, integrity and efficiency. These were then cross-referenced and aggregated to 
provide more general observations about democracy, citizenship, the law, public 
administration, policy, politics, social change and economy. This paper draws from these 
data and focuses on the relationships between fairness, citizenship, democracy, 
institutional design and rapid socio-economic change, or globalisation.  
 
Open questions and invitations to free-flowing narrative allow respondents to discuss ideas 
and topics that are most relevant to them. They also enable participants to complement 
quantitative pre-determined categories with their own voices and may also highlight 
important trends that can be incorporated into future hypotheses and surveys. Open 
questions allow participants to deploy a range of narrative strategies, from one-sentence 
answers through to comprehensive commentaries that illuminate tax paying and 
compliance practices as they operate in people’s lives and experiences (Williams, 2003).  
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Bankman and Karlinsky (2002) suggest that qualitative data and research1 has two main 
theoretical advantages. First, qualitative data allows for concept analysis or the utilisation 
of a ‘theoryanalytic’ approach that is commensurate with ‘generalisability’. Second, 
narratives provided in surveys, interviews or from fieldwork have a ‘sensitising’ effect in 
that they cover issues in a meaningful way that people can relate to (Bankman & 
Karlinsky, 2002, p. 3). Open ended questions and subsequent narrative responses facilitate 
the discovery of new meanings, categories and world-views in the development of 
theoretical approaches, rather than verifying a specific theory through quantification and 
measurement. Both qualitative and quantitative approaches can complement each other 
through the triangulation of data, or they can stand alone, each offering a way of enhancing 
our understanding of social and cultural worlds. Qualitative data, both individual responses 
and aggregated themes and trends, voiced in response to open-ended questions and 
requests for commentaries on large surveys may also be particularly poignant in periods of 
rapid social change. This is particularly the case in the context of economic restructuring 
and globalisation which has transformed the relationship between citizens and the state in 
the past 20 years, both in Australia and internationally (Agnes, 2000; Stimson, 2001).  
 
In social and cultural anthropology, qualitative data has been epistemologically privileged 
in research, analysis and ethnography2, particularly that grounded in participant 
observation (Malinowski, 1966 [1922]). Even where responses to open ended questions are 
not based on face-to-face contact, these stories are nevertheless amenable to ethnographic 
analysis, in so far as individual commentaries can be explored by examining the ever-
increasing webs of significance and meanings of processes, trends and themes (Geertz, 
1973; Weber, 1978).  
 
                                                 
1 Bankman and Karlinsky (2002) discuss the advantages of qualitative data from interview based field-studies 
rather than surveys. However, the inclusion of open questions in surveys still produces qualitatively rich 
material. These may not be as individually comprehensive in their content or length as in-depth interviews, 
but they provide a large number of responses that demonstrate relationships between patterns and processes, 
amenable to interpretative analysis. 
2 Ethnography refers to both anthropological texts and monographs but also to a specific methodological 
approach emphasising qualitative research strategies that give primacy to people’s lived experiences, 
narratives, views and practices. While it was once almost exclusively based on long-term fieldwork, 
necessitating in-depth participant observation, it is increasingly being employed in areas beyond 
anthropology, particularly in applied social research that incorporates interview, focus group and open-ended 
survey methodologies. 
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This is not limited to anthropology. The historian Martin Daunton (2001) suggests that 
debates about taxation and the role of the revenue authority can be interpreted as 
conversations between citizens and state, between the ‘political language’ of persons, 
groups and different forms of income on the one hand and the institutional structures of 
governance on the other (Daunton, 2001, p. 387). These conversations can be expressed in 
qualitative form – whether in responses to open ended surveys, interviews, focus groups, 
participant observation or in content analysis of print, visual and audio medias and in 
detailed archival investigation. One way of interpreting these conversations is to 
conceptualise tax paying as a series of mediated cultural acts and the Tax Office as a 
cultural institution. As such the voices that emerge in this survey provide crucial insights 
into the tax system that can be reframed as a cultural field of struggle, embodying both 
cooperation and contestation over the meaning of fairness, citizenship and the state. 
 
Ethnographic inquiry and taxation as cultural practice: The fiscal value of anthropology 
 
Culture lends significance to human experience by selecting from and organising it. 
It refers broadly to the forms through which people make sense of their lives 
(Rosaldo, 1989, p. 26). 
 
Ethnographic inquiry can furnish analyses of social issues with critical lenses for 
approaching taxation, citizenship, governmentality, democracy and the state and 
conceptualising bureaucratic institutions such as the Tax Office. It does so through 
highlighting people’s perspectives on these phenomena. One particular aspect of 
anthropology has been its emphasis on invoking the ethnographic method to bring people 
who are usually excluded from daily participation in elite political life and formal 
institutions of governance into view. In her review of the relationship between 
anthropology and democracy, Julia Paley suggests this involves paying close attention to 
lived experiences, local meanings and contestations of power relations. This has been 
possible because of the emphasis anthropology places on relationships with ‘people outside 
of formal and elite political institutions’ (Paley, 2002, p. 469).  
 
An ethnographic sensibility can be particularly useful in research endeavours that are not 
based necessarily on fieldwork, but do pay close attention to people’s worldviews and 
 6
experiences. They are amenable to forms of cultural analysis. ‘Culture’ has been a widely 
debated and problematic concept in anthropology and sociology to the extent that some 
doubt its continued epistemological value. However, culture can be reinvigorated by 
recalling Weber’s verstehen analytical method, which necessitated that social action be 
understood by examining specific meanings of particular practices from emic (actor-
orientated) perspectives. Walker (2001) has recently revisited Weber’s kultursoziologie 
(cultural-sociology) and has argued that culture (kultur), rather than society, was the main 
aim of Weber’s sociology. Culture for Weber (1949) consisted of processes whereby 
people inscribed the world with meaning and significance. Walker (2001, p. 43) cites 
Weber’s definition of culture in the following passage: 
 
‘Culture’ is a finite segment of the meaningless infinity of the world process, a 
segment on which human beings confer meaning and significance … The 
transcendental presupposition of every cultural science lies … in the fact that we 
are cultural beings, endowed with the capacity and the will to take a deliberate 
attitude towards the world and lend it significance (Weber, 1949, p. 81, cited in 
Walker, 2001, p. 43).  
 
Weber’s interpretive ‘cultural-sociology’ was extremely influential in the work of the 
anthropologist Clifford Geertz (1973) who invoked culture as an historically and 
symbolically contingent system of meanings by which people constructed and shared their 
practices, lives and knowledge with each other. Geertz states (1973, p. 5) that: 
 
Believing, with Max Weber, that man [sic] is an animal suspended in webs of 
significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs, and the analysis of 
it to be therefore not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretive 
one in search of meaning.  
 
An ethnographic approach therefore consists of establishing and demarcating the 
‘structures of signification’ that embody actions, beliefs, perceptions and discourses 
(Geertz, 1973, p. 9). Thus Geertz (1973, p 28) continues: 
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The aim is to draw large conclusions from small, but very densely textured facts; to 
support broad assertions about the role of culture in the construction of collective 
life by engaging them exactly with complex specifics.  
 
The interpretive value of this view of culture – as a systemic series of dynamic symbols 
and meanings – has had a major influence in anthropology and sociology. Keyes (2002) 
argues that Weber’s legacy cannot only be identified in Geertz’s ‘thick description’, but 
also in Bourdieu’s theory of practice and interpretive sociology and in Foucault’s (1978 
[1976]) work on power, knowledge and the mediating effect of discipline in the formation 
of ‘rational’ subjectivities. For Bourdieu, ‘dispositions’ are manifested in cultural 
expressions of ‘wisdom, sayings, commonplaces, [and] ethical precepts’ that are in turn 
deployed in spatial and social structures of implicit meaning (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 77, cited 
by Keyes, 2002, p. 240). These are precisely the kind of voices that can be heard in 
responses to open questions and commentaries in surveys of the kind discussed here in this 
paper. An ethnographic approach to taxation allows for the construction of ‘actor 
orientated descriptions’ (Geertz, 1973, p. 15) of the Tax Office, tax payment and what it 
means to comply which in turn illuminate issues of wider relevance (‘ever-increasing webs 
of significance’), namely (but not exclusively) fairness, group dynamics, citizenship and 
the position of the state.  
 
This ethnographic approach to culture contrasts strongly to the utilisation of culture in 
accountancy, management and organisational studies, which have been crucial disciplines 
for taxation research. The accountancy scholar Rachel Baskerville (2003) has made a 
powerful critique of the adoption of reified and essentialist notions of culture that have 
characterised accounting and commerce research in the last twenty years. She argues that 
reliance on Geert Hofstede’s attempts to classify and quantify culture by dichotomising 
differences in statistical indices and matrices is misleading. Hofstede equates nation with 
culture when there is no evidence of such co-equivalence. This approach further renders 
dynamic phenomena (power-distance, uncertainty-avoidance, individualism and 
masculinity) static by reference to fixed measures represented as numerical indices and 
matrices supposedly quantifying ‘cultural dimensions’ when in fact they demarcate macro-
level economic and social indicators such as Gross National Product and population 
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growth. These hardly capture the nuances of cultural practice (Baskerville, 2003, pp. 8-9). 
This is further based on observation from outside of culture rather than seeking to 
understand it from within [its own context] (Baskerville, 2003, p. 9). Baskerville (2003,  
pp. 1-2) argues that this has led to a ‘misleading dependence on cultural indices as an 
explanatory variable’.  
 
Anthropologists and sociologists have long since abandoned explaining culture by 
invoking such arbitrary dualisms and attempting to fix the dynamism of human life by 
reference to numeric indices and matrices. As Baskerville (2003, p. 2) states: 
 
… when anthropologists adopt any such concepts of culture, culture is not divided 
into component systems, or different values in a quantitative style; instead it is 
viewed as an integrated pattern of symbols and meanings. Even before Hofstede’s 
survey started, Marshall Sahlins described anthropology leaving behind identifying 
cultures by series of dualisms … and instead promoted that diverse cultural 
emphases represent differing institutional integrations of symbolic schemes.  
 
In contemporary democracies such as Australia there are a number of key institutions and 
processes that link individuals to one another, creating a relationship between citizens and 
state. These include ‘the school’ (education) and the ‘hospital’ (health system), which have 
been successfully explored ethnographically (Hansen, 1997; Levinson, Foley & Holland, 
1996; Willis, 1977). The financial geographer Susan Roberts argues that taxation can be 
conceptualised in a similar way. It is one of the key vectors whereby the private is 
implicated in the public and vice versa (Roberts, 1999, pp. 128-129). In her analysis of tax 
evasion and corruption by the former Irish Prime Minister, Charles Haughey, Roberts 
argues that taxation is a pivotal medium in the private/public dichotomy, a critical dualism 
in the making of modernity. It is through a taxation system that individuals identify with a 
wider public and this identification spans the entire compliance spectrum. The emergence 
of the modern tax state has facilitated the deployment of administrative power to regulate 
individuals and actions so that the population is integrated in procedural practices that 
intersect in the management of daily life (Giddens, 1985, pp. 156-158; Hobson, 2002; 
Roberts, 1999, p. 129). 
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This dialectic between individuals and institutions, and the mediating effect of culture – 
invoked here in the Weberian and Geertzian sense as an articulating compass of shared and 
disputed symbols, actions and meanings – makes ethnographic inquiry a significant 
additional tool for understanding the complexities of the tax system. Geertz (1973, p. 23) 
rightly suggests that ethnographic findings should not be privileged, they are ‘just 
particular’, presented here in this paper to complement other approaches to the study of 
taxation generally and people’s positions in the contemporary state. They are just ‘another 
country heard from’ (Geertz, 1973, p. 23). They allow us to see how the state appears in 
people’s lives through everyday encounters. As the anthropologist Catherine Alexander 
(2002, p. 6) notes in her examination of the relationship between citizens and state in 
Turkey: 
 
Narrations are woven from personal experiences and just as the state of the person 
shifts and changes from moment to moment, from context to context, so too do 
understandings of the state. The state is thus created as a series of narrational 
artefacts, a representational economy. Into this process of imaginable creation are 
drawn the objects that shape and are shaped by the practice of everyday life.  
 
However one does not have to go to Turkey to see this. Anthropology is no longer 
confined to ‘foreign lands’, ‘isolated islands’ or ‘distant tribes’.3 But what anthropologists 
have learned from studying in such places, is that social life is fundamentally concerned 
with the makings and meanings of culture, which can often be most eloquently expressed 
in narrative form. These same structures and nuances of meaning have relevance in 
contemporary nation-states and as such anthropology4 may well be able to play an 
important ‘fiscal role’ in exploring the nuances and complexities of taxation and 
compliance in the twenty-first century.  
 
Taxation and the contours of fairness  
 
By far the most prevalent narrated response to the three open ended questions at the end of 
the survey, The Australian Tax System: Fair or Not?, concerned issues of ‘fairness’.  
                                                 
3 For an analysis of taxation in an indigenous peasant setting see Codoy (1986). 
4 Along with other cognate disciplines such as geography, history, sociology and cultural studies. 
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Sixty-five and a half percent of total participants directly stated at some point to one of the 
three questions that the tax system is, is not, or should be ‘fair’.5 It was both a desirable 
outcome and a valued process.  
 
With reference to the first question, ‘In your own words what do you expect the Tax Office 
to deliver (a) to you?’, 53.9% of respondents said that the Tax Office should be fair in its 
dealings with them. Some of these comments included:  
 
A fair and equitable administration and implementation of taxation regulations. 
 
Consistent, efficient, fair calculation/assessment of tax liability. 
 
A fair tax system for the blue collar worker. 
 
When asked at (b) what they expected the Tax Office to deliver to the community, 49.4% 
per cent of people focused on fairness, with comments such as the following:  
 
Consistent, efficient, fair calculation/assessment of tax liability. Plus respond to 
community views regarding taxation affairs. 
 
Raise enough taxes to pay for health, education, care of elderly, the infirmed and 
young children; roads, transport, law and order costs and finally to balance our 
economy with fair and equitable taxes in which all contribute fairly. 
 
A fair, justifiable tax system and an honest approach to implementing a tax system 
that has the Australian community’s interests at heart.  
 
By contrast when people were asked (c) ‘In your own words, what is your responsibility to 
the Tax Office’ only 20.8% of people directly6 felt that they should be fair in their 
approach to the office. This is not to say that people felt as if they should be unfair in their 
responsibility to the Tax Office, but rather this question elicited responses orientated 
towards compliance with most people focusing on tax payment, and institutional 
expectations related to the self-assessment system such as record keeping and honesty 
                                                 
5 This refers to people who used ‘fair’ as a descriptive adjective and/or invoked the concept of ‘fairness’ as 
abstract noun. 
6 By ‘directly’ I mean people who use the word ‘fair’ or ‘fairness’ at least once. 
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when reporting income. An expectation of fairness, even if not directly stated, is often 
embedded in these commentaries, which include:  
 
To accurately and honestly report all income and deductions incurred and to pay the 
correct amount of tax. 
 
To be true and give correct information. 
 
To declare any taxable income honestly. 
 
In return for this honesty and cooperation people expect to be treated fairly by the Tax 
Office. Participants also wrote long, extensive and thoughtful narratives on the tax system, 
building on the expectation that the tax system should be organised in a fair manner.7 They 
tended to concentrate on the relationship between taxation and equity, stressing that all 
members of society should pay tax regardless of their wealth and earning capacity.8 They 
also tended to emphasise perceived differences in compliance between the very rich, 
‘ordinary Australians’ and low-income earners who are considered to carry a 
disproportionately (and hence unfair) high tax liability. The implications of these 
perceptions will be discussed in the next section of this paper, but for now it is necessary to 
unpack the cultural nuances of what may be meant when people assert that the Tax Office 
should be fair in its dealings with them and the community.  
                                                 
7 This emphasis on fairness in taxation is also part of official Tax Office policy. The Taxpayers’ Charter for 
example, has numerous references to fairness in tax collection. Under the section ‘The Tax Office’s 
relationship with the community’, the Tax Office states that ‘Within this relationship we see … a 
professional and responsive Tax Office that is fair, open and accountable in helping members of the 
community comply with their tax obligations at least cost and inconvenience to themselves’ (Australian 
Taxation Office, 2003, p. 3). Official Tax Office discourse often parallels the issues and concerns identified 
by participants in this survey. Space does not permit a detailed comparison between the Tax Office’s official 
voice and participant’s narratives, but an examination of the two perspectives shows a potential for enhanced 
dialogue and understanding between the community and the Tax Office. 
8 There was minimal support for the argument that fairness and equality within the tax system has become 
counterproductive and undermined economic growth. There were a small number of respondents who 
subscribed to the idea that a certain level of inequality in the tax system could be tolerated in the interests of a 
competitive economy. This tended to be reflected in calls for the implementation of a flat rate of income tax. 
However, even these views were framed in discourses of fairness. For example, one respondent said that 
there should be ‘a fair tax system’ and then added that a ‘flat tax with no deductions would be fairer.’ 
Another said ‘I can not see why, we in Australia could not have a flat tax across the board rather than by 
income. It would be fairer and easier as well as more economical.’ Participants with these perspectives 
suggested that it was ‘unfair’ for people to pay differing amounts of tax, or that they should have to pay more 
than others. This penalised their financial position in society and undermined the productive capacity of 
businesses to employ more people and contribute to increased economic growth. However, this position was 
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Fairness as process and fair in outcome are deeply subjective concepts of expected 
behaviour and action concerning the fulfilment of mutually agreed upon, or expected, 
obligations and bargains concerning resource distribution. In practice however, fairness is 
dynamic, fluid and contingent. What may be fair for one person or group may be 
considered unfair to another (MacKellar, 1997; Platlow, Wenzel & Nolan, 2001; Wenzel, 
2003). It is fraught with political implications that are saturated with culturally 
circumscribed acts of power.  
 
Fairness can be approached in two broad ways. The first emphasises individual action, 
embodying various modifications of the rational-actor paradigm. This in turn lends itself to 
neo-liberal conceptualisations of economy and society in which individuals are pre-
occupied with maximising their own rational self-interests with minimum external 
interference. Processes that enable individual self-maximising behaviour are considered 
fair. Outcomes are also considered fair if the pursuit of individual goals is not constrained 
by external state regulations over and above the protection of private property rights. If 
social inequalities happen to be one of the outcomes of individual self-maximisation, then 
they are not unto themselves unfair. Market intervention that restricts or undermines 
personal rights to buy and sell goods and services and enter into contracts in the pursuit of 
individual self-interest in order to ameliorate social inequalities is thus considered unfair 
according to this model.  
 
This rational-actor neo-liberal approach to fairness contrasts to the second more 
communitarian depictions of fairness, which privileges the social over the individual. In 
these socially orientated models, outcomes are privileged over processes. Processes must 
insure fair outcomes to as many people as possible, regardless of an individual’s position 
within the marketplace. From this perspective, market intervention is warranted if it leads 
to fairness of outcomes. With this epistemological position, inequalities are considered 
unfair. Appropriate policies and procedures should be enacted and enforced to mitigate 
against wide-spread social inequalities, and hence contribute towards a fairer society. In 
this position culture, or specific cultural practices, can take a central position. It illustrates 
                                                                                                                                                    
limited to a small minority of respondents. See Braithwaite (2003) for a further discussion of these issues, 
especially her ‘economic self-interest hypothesis’. 
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how people themselves act in the world, illuminating the dialectic or continuum between 
agency and structure, rather than assuming primacy of the former over the latter. A cultural 
lens can also illustrate how concepts such as ‘rationality’, which are naturalised and 
assumed in the neo-liberal model, are in fact historically contingent.9 This contrasts to the 
neo-liberal approach to economy and society in which cultural practice is negated as an 
epiphenomenal by-product of individual self-maximisation, despite its enlightenment 
origins in the bifurcation of nature and culture.10  
                                                 
9 The cultural meanings of fairness are set in the contingencies of time and place. Within indigenous, non-
state, societies fairness is embodied in ‘generalised reciprocity’, emphasising gift exchange and the 
distribution of intra-group resources on a relatively equal basis (Durkheim, 1960 [1893]; Durkheim & Mauss, 
1963 [1903]; Mauss, 1954 [1925]; Sahlins, 1972). Fair distributions are made in systems of exchange, which 
guarantee that very few (if any) people are deprived of the material and symbolic necessities of life (Sahlins, 
1972, p. 213). The cultural expressions of ‘the gift’ and what is considered fair have varied through time and 
between societies, from the Kwakiutl Potlatch of Northwestern British Columbia to the egalitarian political 
system of the Nuer in southern Sudan (Boas, 1966; Evans-Pritchard, 1969 [1940]).  
 
The cultural specificities of what is and is not ‘fair’ are often most transparent in conflicts over resources 
between indigenous non-state societies on the one hand, and nation-states on the other. In nation-states, 
whereby inter-personal relationships are characterised by varying degrees of social distance and anonymity, 
cultures of fairness are set in more abstracted forms of religion, codified laws, and specified political and 
economic arrangements.  
 
Western notions of fairness have their origins in Judeo-Christian expectations, norms, values, ethics and 
moral standards of behaviour. Many of these, such as trust, honesty and integrity are learnt in intimate 
familial surroundings and extended out into impersonal institutions and to relative strangers (Job & Reinhart, 
2003). Ideas of fairness were secularised in the enlightenment, and in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
dichotomised between proponents of ‘fairness as individual economic liberty’ and ‘fairness as collective 
economic equality’. In western nation-states, through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, implicit 
concerns about fairness were expressed in the church, charities, legal reforms and also in the growing cultural 
legitimacy accorded to emotional and cognitive states such as sentimentality (Dickey, 1987; Kennedy, 1985; 
Mandler, 1990; Samuels, 1992). Important distinctions between western countries started to become 
important in this period. Daunton (2002, p. 9) for example, shows that in the United States, expenditure on 
civil war pensions had strong partisan connotations and led to a general distrust of welfare expenditure. He 
contrasts this to the United Kingdom where, given different circumstances, there was widespread support for 
increased government spending in the economy. What is important here is that the nuanced differences over 
what is and what is not fair within and between countries can be traced to specific places, histories, politics, 
events, policies and economies that interact in dynamic ways to produce cultural logics with their own 
distinctive features. 
10 Accountancy also offers important insights into concepts of fairness, which can be traced to the emergence 
of the joint-stock company and the increased importance of external reporting (Tweedie, 1983, p. 424). The 
associated rise of the stock exchange and the transfer of shares between parties not directly involved in the 
management of the firm depended on the capacity to conclude fair bargains. Fair agreements between parties 
(shareholders, directors and creditors) needed accurate information about corporate performance and long-
term profitability. This information could be presented in ‘accounts’ portraying a company’s assets and 
liabilities, profits and losses expressed as an independent ‘truth’ in balance sheets and ledgers. ‘True’ and 
‘fair’ were thus conflated as hendiadys (National Companies and Securities Commission, 1984, p. 20). This 
approach to true and fair acknowledges the importance of groups of stakeholders (just as much as individual 
actors motivated by self-interest) in reaching decisions, including shareholders, creditors, directors, 
lawmakers and regulators.  
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This also has fundamental implications for views of the state. Rational actor approaches 
tend to favour the view that individuals relate to the state through the vectors of its 
institutions through contractual obligations, privileging individual liberties over society 
and social relations (Boucher & Kelly, 1994; Rawls, 1973). The leading contemporary 
social contractarian theorist, John Rawls11 (1973 & 2001), does not suggest that this 
conceptualisation of citizen-state relations necessarily warrants deregulated market driven 
economic relations in which individual self-maximisation can be fully realised. However, 
the very act of ranking personal liberty as paramount and equality as secondary, have 
allowed theorists such as Robert Nozick (1974) to take one step further and argue for 
extreme market-liberalism, where the state should do little more than protect private 
property rights. Indeed in this version of the contractarian position, society is almost totally 
irrelevant – it is individuals who are the bearers of liberty.  
 
An alternative perspective approaches citizen/state relations – manifested in domains such 
as taxation – as culturally mediated relationships between social selves and the institutions 
of governance. Here individual potential is realised through responsive regulations and 
laws, with the goal being equality of outcome, and the state a pluralist expression of 
democratic procedures. Procedural justice (fair processes) and distributive justice (fair 
outcomes) are given epistemological equivalence. This resonates with Marian Sawer’s 
(2000) analysis of the ‘ethical state’, which draws on the earlier Hegelian critique of 
contract.12 She demonstrates the relationships between ideas of social liberalism and their 
                                                                                                                                                    
Furthermore, these perspectives allow for dynamism and consider changing social circumstances when fairly 
and truthfully reflecting financial ‘realities’ (see also Maurer, 2002 for the role of derivatives in producing 
such truth claims). As Tweedie (1983, p. 428) suggests ‘The true and fair view develops by consensus and 
usage. Rules developed by a committee of professional men, [sic] no matter how eminent, cannot arbitrarily 
change the boundaries of the concept unless such rules meet with professional and social acceptance.’ These 
insights into true and fair offered by accountancy research are particularly compelling in the post-Enron 
financial regulatory landscape. They are also important when considering international tax planning where 
accounts can be presented in ways that seem at odds with the original intention of a ‘true and fair’ portrayal. 
11 Rawls (1973) is credited with reviving and synthesising the albeit variegated enlightenment notions of 
contractualism epitomised by Hobbes (1968 [1668]), and extended by Kant (1957 [1795]) and Rosseau (1968 
[1762]). 
12 Boucher and Kelly (1994, p. 23) summarise Hegel’s critique of contract as follows:  
‘The language of contract transfers from civil society, the realm of capricious wills and individual interest, a 
relationship totally inappropriate for characterising that which pertains between the individual and the state. 
The state is not, for Hegel, a contractual relation designed to protect the property rights of individuals nor is it 
to be deemed the private property of the monarch … The political relationship is qualitatively different in 
that it is absolutely necessary, objective and released from considerations of choice or caprice.’ 
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subsequent transmission as policy to settler states such as Australia and New Zealand. The 
argument that the state must intervene in ‘contract’ (given the unequal bargaining power of 
parties) became increasingly persuasive in late nineteenth and early twentieth century 
Britain. These arguments were transmitted by immigrant politicians, scholars, writers and 
members of the judiciary to Australia and New Zealand where they coincided with nation 
building projects. This led to the formulation of policies, new laws, regulations and the 
establishment of institutions of arbitration and conciliation. They became crucial in the 
state provision of education, health care, public infrastructure and social security.  
 
There are other factors that were important in the increasing scale of state intervention in 
society and economy such as the power of organised labour, trade protectionism, 
technological innovations, federalism and agricultural and industrial change. However, 
Sawer (2000) provides a compelling analytical framework from which to conceptualise 
fairness, rejecting the narrow individualism of the rational-actor model in favour of the 
communitarian paradigm of the social good.13 
 
In this view the state has a right, duty and the capacity to intervene in social and economic 
relations, and this was more important than absolute private property rights and the 
‘sanctity of contract’ (Sawer, 2000, p. 69). The state had an opportunity to create the 
conditions necessary whereby human potential could be released and fulfilled and self-
actualisation realised. Pre-existing inequalities, which exposed the deficiencies in the 
                                                 
13 Sawer (2000) carefully charts the interplay between ideas (idealist liberalism), policies and outcomes. 
There were close links between British and settler colonial social reform movements in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries. These brought together politicians, scholars, writers, journalists and educators. 
While other factors (such as economic, demographic and political change) were important in their own right, 
Sawer (2000) shows that the ideas promoted by social liberal thinkers and activists had important social 
consequences. For example, in the 1907 Harvester judgment, Justice Henry Higgins, influenced by more than 
40 years of social liberal thought, ruled that a ‘fair’ standard of living should be the main factor in deciding 
the basic wage, not market forces. In a later 1909 decision, Higgins stated that employers should go out of 
business if they could not afford to pay workers a living wage. In 1911, when he was President of the 
Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, Higgins (1911, p. 27, cited in Sawer, 2000, p. 82) 
asserted that: 
‘as a rule, the economic position of the individual employee is too weak for him to hold his own in the 
unequal contest. He is unable to insist on the ‘fair thing’. The power of the employer to withhold bread is a 
much more effective weapon than the power of the employee to refuse to labour. Freedom of contract, under 
such circumstances, is surely misnamed; it should rather be called despotism in contract; and this Court is 
empowered to fix a minimum wage as a check on despotic power.’ 
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notion of ‘free’ contract (which tended to ignore the reality of unequal bargaining power, 
poverty and inequalities) had to be addressed by concerted state policies. Wealth was not 
created by individuals but by society. Individuals were not connected to one another by the 
instrumental relations of contract, but by relationships of mutual social interdependence. 
 
Thus it becomes necessary to conceptualise citizen/state relations not in terms of a social 
contract, but as an interdependent dialectical partnership and relationship, where equality, 
not atomised economic prerogative, is fundamental. As the state and individual grow 
together as mutually interdependent moral agents, ‘older contractarian forms of liberalism’ 
were rejected in favour of newer forms of socially responsible liberalism realised by an 
‘ethical state’ (Sawer, 2000, p. 79). This distinguishes and rejects rational actor orientated 
market liberty, or neo-liberalism as it is known today (with its fetishisation of unfettered 
individual buying and selling rights, agreement to de-regulated contracts and the pursuit of 
enterprise) from social liberty that emphasises group freedom; the ultimate group being the 
nation-state whose ‘imaginings’ are rendered real by policies that promote active 
citizenship (Anderson, 1983; Irving, 1997). It is social liberty that allows taxation – 
mirroring its role in the ‘making of modernity’ that Giddens (1985) and Roberts (1999) 
have highlighted – to become one of the key institutions that link individuals to one 
another and to a ‘wider public’ that share a territorially defined nation-state that is mapped 
in the social imaginary. Modernity becomes grounded in pragmatic policies that epitomise 
the ‘ethical state’. This has far reaching implications in numerous social areas of public 
policy. As Sawer (2000, p. 77) notes ‘Taxation, for example, should not be considered as a 
burden, but in light of the good it brings to the whole community including the taxpayer.’ 
 
Group solidarity and individual self-maximisation  
 
The rational actor approach to fairness, which underlies much neo-liberal reform, has been 
critiqued for its economic determinism and reductionism (Block, 1990; Keenan, 1987; 
Murphy, 2002; Polanyi, 1944; Wenzel, 2003). Wenzel (2003) shows that non-economic 
factors are equally important, including notions of equity, morality, justice and fairness, 
                                                                                                                                                    
These court rulings and related regulatory and legislative reforms in areas of employment, arbitration, 
conciliation, progressive taxation, education, health care and pension provision demonstrate the influence of 
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which transcend the whims of individual caprice and subjective preference, that are reified 
as objective rationality in neo-liberal economics. Non-economic considerations would 
probably be important even if the assumption of individual self-maximisation was 
accepted, but it becomes more compelling once the importance of groups are recognised. 
Platow, Wenzel and Nolan (2003, p. 276) clearly demonstrate, with findings from 
systematic psychological research, that ‘fairness is not an individual intrapsychic 
phenomenon’, but rather contingent on group membership and inter-group negotiation. 
One of the key advantages of this perspective is that it emphasises the importance of 
groups.  
 
Indeed group membership is crucial for understanding fairness. Groups provide a strong 
basis for fairness decisions, with distributions and allocations often made at the expense of 
personal self-interest in favour of the group. However, fairness and its meaning is fluid and 
changes depending on context. Society is composed of multiple inter-dependent groups 
with individuals identifying, to various extents, with a number of different groups. Some of 
these are sub-groups based on face-to-face contact or common interests, such as sports 
teams, churches, workers, employers, institutions and so on. Others are superordinate 
groups based on nationality, citizenship and a sense of belonging to a wider community. 
As Platow, Wenzel and Nolan (2003, p. 269) point out, these groups can be ‘workers, an 
organization, or a nation’. Different groups will have their own cultural values and 
practices, which are legitimated by standards of expected behaviour. Importantly these 
groups will erect inclusive and exclusive boundaries, which will construct differential 
intra-group and inter-group rights when distributions are made. A fair allocation may take 
place within a group, but as soon as that distribution is extended outside the group, then its 
fairness may be questioned, even if the proportional allocations are identical.  
 
These in-group and out-group perceptions of fairness permeate through nation-states and 
affect tax systems (Taylor, 2003). In Australia, and this is reflected in people’s 
commentaries about the tax system and its relationship to public expenditure, there is a 
strong emphasis on treating ‘every one as the same’ (on the grounds that they are ‘all 
Australians’ or ‘we are all tax payers’), which Platow, Wenzel and Nolan (2003) define as 
                                                                                                                                                    
social liberalism in the first two decades of the Australian Commonwealth. 
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the equity rule of fairness decision making. This is contrasted to the needs rule, which 
makes fairness allocations on the basis of difference. This can include special provisions 
for minority groups, women, single parents, refugees, indigenous Australians and some 
groups of workers. The needs rule can also be manifested in perceived financial 
concessions (in terms of tax breaks) for the wealthy. This needs based approach to fairness 
decisions appears to have only minimal support in Australia. It tends to reinforce a 
schismatic view of society as being composed of diametrically opposed social groups, 
whose intense competition undermines national cohesiveness. While groups may be 
important in this view, they should be secondary to ‘higher loyalties’, more inclusive 
superordinate collectivities, even if they are essentialist and reified categories, such as ‘the 
community’ or the ‘nation’ in which ‘everyone is treated the same’ on the basis of a shared 
citizenship. Needs based allocations, if they are to be made at all, must be sufficiently 
compelling, such as the special provision of goods and services in the wake of natural 
disasters. Australia’s system of democracy has tended to recognise the social schisms that 
intense inter-group competition can generate and has sought to ameliorate these divisions 
through public policy – particularly in the domains of arbitration and conciliation as Sawer 
(2000) has so succinctly outlined – through placing itself above various sectoral interests 
and conflicts and making well-informed public policy decisions for the benefit of all. This 
has tended to take place on principles of equity, but has not been adverse to needs based 
approaches where necessary (even if publicly unpopular).  
 
Daunton (1998; 2001; 2002) has shown that the state must not be seen as biased in its 
approach to any one particular group/s in order to secure the legitimacy of the tax system. 
The state must be seen as impartial and neutral in its taxation policies, removed from 
sectoral interests, in order to facilitate a sense of fairness that transcends group based 
rivalries, and secure its own independent authority rather than further the interests of a tiny 
elite. It must be an independent arbitrator that recognises that ‘no one group has a 
monopoly on fairness’ (Platow, Wenzel & Nolan, 2003, p. 276). This is absolutely 
necessary to maintain trust in the integrity and legitimacy of both the state and its key 
competencies such as the tax system.  
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What we see in the narrated responses to the The Australian Tax System – Fair or Not 
Survey however, is that this appeal to a superordinate sense of shared Australian identity as 
a basis for taxation compliance is beginning to break-down, or at the least is under severe 
stress. This is occurring as people no longer privilege the classification of ‘Australians’ as 
‘one-group’ based on shared citizenship rights and obligations, even though this remains a 
normative ideal (in other words ‘Australians should all be treated the same’ regardless of 
class or group affiliation). Rather citizenship is being fragmented into variegated groups of 
‘rich’, ‘average’ (the majority of respondents classified themselves as ‘average’) and 
‘poor’.  
 
The narrated responses to The Australian Tax System – Fair or Not Survey show that the 
fairness of the tax system is being compromised by perceptions that the rich – or HWIs – 
are avoiding their tax-paying fiscal responsibilities on a massive scale. In other words the 
wealthy are being seen as a group for whom the same rules of fairness do not apply (see 
Braithwaite, 2003). They have their own rules, but these are not necessarily fair to the rest 
of society. Thus the state is failing in its key competency as an independent arbitrator of 
divergent group interests. It is no longer up-holding principles of pluralist democracy, but 
is seen to be favouring one group over all others, and this is reflected in one of the most 
crucial junctures of state/citizen relations of all – taxation. As Sawer (2000, pp. 89-90) 
affirms: 
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We seem to have unlearned many of the things which social liberalism taught us, 
such as that ‘freedom of choice’ is meaningless if we don’t have the material and 
cultural means for self-development. A hundred years ago social liberals knew that 
it was the duty of the state to intervene, whether in the labour market, the housing 
market or in other ways, such as through the provision of free schooling, libraries, 
museums and art galleries, to ensure such equality of opportunity … Today our 
expectations of what our governments can or should do have been dramatically 
reduced. Most worrying is that the unlearning of what the social liberals taught us 
about the oppressive nature of contract where there are inequalities of economic and 
social power. If government does not intervene in such contracts we have indeed 
given up on the ‘ethical state’ in which so much faith was placed a hundred years 
ago.  
 
Maybe however, people have not unlearned many of the principles Sawer identifies. 
Indeed, people may not have so much as ‘given-up’ on the ‘ethical state’, but rather are 
taking note of one group of powerful social actors who appear to have undue influence in 
state procedures in a way that produces unfair outcomes for other groups. It may well be 
that this greater transparency will ultimately restore trust, integrity and legitimacy to the 
tax system in a way that transcends the schismatic tendencies of vested group interests. 
 
On the precipice of trust: Citizenship, globalisation and the critique of unfair liability 
 
Although people articulate the view that the Tax Office, and by extension the tax system, 
should be fair to both themselves and the Australian community, this is negated by a 
widespread perception that it is bureaucratically and systemically unfair. As one 
respondent observed: 
 
… it is unfair to the community as a whole. There are too many loopholes for 
creative accounting and the top end of town is able to exploit these deficiencies. I 
wish the Government would scrap the lot and start again. However, this would be 
impossible.  
 
This sense of unfairness is based on an even more pervasive perception; that the wealthy 
are not paying a proportionate share of taxes relative to ‘everyone else’s’. In other words 
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the rich are not paying their ‘fair share’ of taxes. When taxation is no longer considered 
fair, it ceases to be a form of mutual obligation (in terms of the ‘good it brings to the 
community’ [Sawer, 2000, p. 77]) and becomes ‘a burden’: A burden because it is middle 
income earners, the less well-off and the poor who are believed to be supporting the civic 
infrastructure and democratic prosperity that everyone benefits from, including the rich and 
their businesses who are unfavourably considered exempt from the tax liabilities that 
everyone else must comply with. In her quantitative analysis of the results of an earlier 
survey conducted by the CTSI (the Community Hopes, Fears and Actions Survey) 
Braithwaite (2003) found that despite the complexity in perceptions of vertical inequity in 
the tax system, there is widespread belief that HWIs are not paying their fair share of taxes.  
 
The prevalence of these views resonated a year later in the narrated responses to the 
present The Australian Tax System – Fair or Not Survey. Most people did not directly state 
that ‘the tax office and the tax system is unfair’, but rather deployed rhetorical strategies 
that emphasised the lack of procedural and distributive fairness by implication, contrasting 
the ideal of equity with observations of vertical inequity. Some of the responses that 
followed these narrative strategies in response to ‘In your own words, what do you expect 
the Tax Office to deliver (b) to the Australian Community’ included: 
 
A fair, equitable and easy to understand tax system. Emphasis on fair for all 
members of society paying their fair share of tax, not just burdens on wage and 
salary earners.  
 
Equality. Millionaires should not pay less than an ordinary tax payer. 
 
1. To collect from all citizens their due taxes and not to allow the powerful to 
‘negotiate’ an ‘acceptable’ amount of tax payable. 
2. To remember, mistakes are made honestly and not everyone tries to cheat. 
3. Investigate the trust funds and family trusts set up by people who suddenly 
declare themselves bankrupt. 
 
Most respondents did not mention vertical inequity, or the perceptions of fairness or 
unfairness when asked at (c) In your own words, what is your responsibility to the Tax 
Office. However, one respondent approached this question by saying ‘The tax office would 
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get more respect from me if they were empowered to fulfil their charter. I pay my tax but 
the rich do not. The highest incomes are the most understated of all, most of their wealth 
derives from capital, therefore is most amenable to tax avoidance’. Open commentaries 
emphasised the belief that the wealthy are no longer paying their ‘fair share of tax’, with 
statements such as: 
 
I’m now a retired invalid but while working was amazed at the tax havens and 
dodges which still have not been addressed by any government and seem to be on 
the increase. Lets have an Aussie Fair Go for all and not just the rich and famous.  
 
I would like the Tax Office to finally take action against Barristers who have been 
able to escape paying tax for years but are still able to practice in their profession 
and earning very big money. The department certainly doesn’t allow ordinary 
taxpayers to get away with not paying. Even if it is a very small amount they are 
held accountable. It is grossly unfair to the other people as some people just live 
week to week. 
 
The message comes over that Barristers can find loopholes in your law and that they 
are too big and too smart for you to catch. You are expecting us as citizens to report 
people who get cash payments for jobs. The same rules should apply to all people 
regardless of your status in life. 
 
Both qualitative and quantitative (Braithwaite, 2003) analyses therefore demonstrate that 
there is a widespread perception that the Tax Office is not delivering a fair system to the 
Australian public because there are certain wealthy groups, which are seen as separating 
themselves from the rest of society through their exemption from taxation. As one 
respondent observed, ‘The rich buy political patronage’, while another declared ‘There is 
no doubt that wealthy people can afford to evade tax’. These perceptions of inequality in 
tax compliance undermine the legitimacy of the revenue system. Moreover, this legitimacy 
varies through time, depending on the interplay of specific economic, political, fiscal, 
demographic and spatial factors (Daunton, 1998; 2001; 2002; Freiberg, 1988; McLean & 
Smith, 1997; O’Keefe, 2000).  
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Daunton (1998; 2001; 2002) suggests that it is possible for the state to create institutional 
legitimacy in the tax system, and the sense that everyone is paying his or her fair share of 
taxes. Consent and trust are fundamental in this process, but once they are achieved then 
the legitimacy of a tax system can be maintained for generations. In the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries this was achieved by creating a sense of balance and fairness, with the 
state perceived as a neutral arbitrator between groups and classes. Levels of taxation and 
expenditure followed this sense of fairness, from balanced budgets and conservative 
government expenditure in the nineteenth century through to increased taxes and wider 
spending parameters from the end of the first world war to the early 1970s. However, 
Daunton (2001) suggests that such a system is inelastic. It does not respond well in periods 
of rapid economic growth, stress or change. Daunton (2001, p. 12) notes ‘A system that 
seemed fair in one set of circumstances might be seen as arbitrary and unreasonable as the 
context altered’. If the tax system kept up with economic growth then fairness, cooperation 
and legitimacy could be maintained. If economic change was volatile, rapid, unpredictable, 
or corresponded to a perceived radical departure from established policies (such as 
favouring low inflation over full employment, or vice versa depending on era) then the 
requirement to constantly alter taxes can lead to a decline in confidence, cooperation, trust, 
legitimacy and compliance (Daunton, 2001).  
 
Institutional design, or the operation of the revenue authority (the Tax Office in Australia’s 
case) is crucial in maintaining a sense of fairness and balance (see Murphy, 2003; Wenzel 
& Taylor, 2003). Following established bureaucratic practices, policies, rules and 
regulations can work well in times of social and economic certainty. It legitimises the 
Weberian ethos of rational-legality and contributes to an understanding of the state as an 
impartial arbitrator between groups and thus reinforces a sense of fairness and balance. 
However, it can lead to inertia and inflexibility in times of rapid social and economic 
transformation, where change itself is often described as inequitable and unfair (Daunton 
2001, p. 16). One participant in The Australian Tax System – Fair or Not Survey expressed 
it succinctly enough in open commentary: 
 
The Tax Office operation is archaic … it is too slow to respond and banks on its 
ability to make decisions years after the event. For example, the recent tax 
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minimisation schemes and even the ‘Rhaulis affair’. They are too slow in coming 
forward. It is all too hard for them!  
 
This respondent is identifying one of the major predicaments that confronts a tax office: 
the time delay factor, between the adoption of new taxation vehicles and institutional 
practices on the one hand and rapid economic and social transformation on the other. There 
is a time-lag between changes in taxation and changes in economy, society and polity.  
 
Indeed globalisation has become a metaphor for time. Globalisation can be defined as a 
process involving the compression of the time-space continuum generating increased and 
accelerated flows of goods, services, money, people and images across borders, demanding 
their simultaneous liberalisation and regulation (Appadurai, 1990; Foster, 1999; Harvey, 
1989). These are the rapid economic and social transformations that confront tax 
authorities today. However, while the term globalisation may be relatively recent (gaining 
in popularity as an explanatory discourse only from about 1990), its precursors have their 
origins in the economic changes of the early 1970s, the decade that provided the conditions 
that made globalisation possible. The 1970s witnessed the materialisation of inherent 
structural contradictions in post-World War II international economic arrangements that 
were unleashed by increased foreign currency trading (the eurobond market which 
circumvented foreign exchange controls), the termination of dollar-gold convertibility and 
the oil price shocks of 1972-1974.  
 
Government responses in industrialised democracies to these crises from the 1970s through 
the 1980s were based on neo-liberal economic restructuring which had two key facets. 
First, low inflation was privileged over full employment. There was a transition from 
Keynesian policies that emphasised full employment through state intervention in the 
economy to monetarist policies. These latter policies, ultimately premised on the rational-
actor paradigm, were concerned with maintaining low inflation through controlling the 
money supply. Monetarism also accepted a degree of unemployment as inevitable and 
even necessary to curtail the power of organised labour to maintain pressure on employers 
to constantly increase wages (and hence fuel inflationary pressures). Second, this economic 
restructuring valorised the rational actor approach in public policy development and 
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implementation, pursuing the ‘fairness as personal economic liberty’ model in all areas of 
state-citizen relations including education, housing, health care, welfare and criminal 
justice (Hobson, 2002; Murphy, 2002; Stimpson, 2002). As discussed earlier this model of 
fairness deems it unfair for the state to intervene in the economy in guarantee of equity of 
outcomes. Hence the state systematically minimised its interests in the economy. State 
owned enterprises were privatised, foreign exchange controls lifted and the economy 
opened up to multinational investment following the ethos of multilateral cross-border free 
trade. Although money supply was controlled by monetary instruments (namely the ability 
of a central or reserve bank to set interest rates with statutory independence from the 
government) and the institutionalisation of structural unemployment it was simultaneously 
‘liberated’ from government controls. The individual, accepted in public policy, as an 
autonomous, rational self-maximising actor was now free to move money as he or she 
pleased with limited government restrictions, both domestically and internationally.  
 
In the last decade these transformations have taken on global proportions. They have also 
provided massive opportunities for tax minimisation, avoidance and evasion. Indeed 
revenue authorities have been struggling to keep up with these changes for the past thirty 
years. Freiberg (1988) shows that tax minimisation schemes started to proliferate in the 
1970s. They have not stopped. As the Tax Office is empowered with new laws to insure 
compliance, more lacuna or gaps in the national and international regulatory landscape are 
identified for the wealthy (and even not so wealthy) to exploit. Between 1996 and 2002 tax 
legislation expanded from 3 500 pages to 8 500 (Inglis, 2002, p. 6). Just as one loop-hole is 
closed another is found and opened up. The last thirty years have been characterised by 
constant time lags between policy and practice, between the Tax Office and its increasingly 
non-compliant clientele, between institutional change and socio-economic change. The 
wealthy have been able to take advantage of these transformations and engage in forms of 
arbitrage to minimise their taxes on a global scale (J. Braithwaite, 2003). The law itself 
becomes a device in effective ‘tax efficient’ minimisation techniques, a point not lost on 
participants in The Australian Tax System – Fair or Not Survey who observed: 
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Stop very wealthy people from using schemes to pay little tax (for example Packer, 
J. Elliot, A. Bond, etc.). They have clever lawyers who know all the loopholes. 
 
Make tax laws that can stop loop-holes being used by the people in high places, 
who can then stay ahead of the Tax Officers and get away with very large amounts 
of money (also they will fight the Tax Office in the courts).  
 
To pay closer attention to corporations and companies that pay little or no tax. To 
examine more deeply tax avoidance and ‘off shore’ operations and tax avoidance.  
 
A fair system for all. There are too many loopholes that big business and rich 
people use. Kerry Packer pays less personal income tax than I do. How can they say 
that is fair?  
 
These views, that the wealthy are not fulfilling their tax duties and that the Tax Office and 
the tax system is unfair, consequently leads to the perception that the state is no longer 
neutral in its dealings with all groups in society, but rather has been captured by vested 
corporate interests. Regardless of whether or not this is fact, the perception remains that the 
state, and its key competencies such as taxation, is beholden to the rich. It leads to the 
belief that there is one set of rules for the wealthy and another for everyone else. As one 
participant stated in response to the question about what the Tax Office should deliver to 
the community: 
 
[a] simple tax system and be consistent. Not to take the small people to the end of 
their tether and leave the big corporations and rich names alone to evade their 
responsibilities.  
 
Daunton’s suggestion that even change can be viewed as unfair and unequal is particularly 
poignant. However, changes associated with economic restructuring and globalisation have 
been apace for the last thirty years, creating an increasingly variegated citizenry, 
disillusioned with contemporary democracy and the quality of state services such as tax 
administration. There are two related definitions of citizenship. First, is jural; it is a legal 
status conferred by an internationally recognised state signifying belonging to that country 
or jurisdiction. The second definition is more processual and establishes citizenship as a 
series of rights and obligations that can be activated by negotiation and participation in 
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society (Amit, 2001; Walter & MacLeod, 2002). Paradoxically while citizens are formally 
equal in status, this belies the existence of substantial inequalities between citizens. This 
makes citizenship as legal status a highly unstable category due to the contradiction 
between jural equality and the inequalities inscribed in the rational actor approach. When 
people consider current taxation policies and institutional design as unfair because the rich 
are perceived to be paying less tax than everyone else then they are identifying what 
Aiwha Ong (1999, pp. 215-216, cited in Paley, 2002, p. 481) characterises as: 
 
a system of graduated sovereignty, whereby citizens in zones that are differently 
articulated to global production and financial circuits are subjected to different 
kinds of surveillance and enjoy different sets of civil and economic rights.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The emergence of such variegated notions of citizenship has brought trust in the tax system 
to the precipice of public confidence and legitimacy. Murphy (2003) has shown that public 
authorities must be seen as neutral in their dealings with citizens. They must be seen as 
treating everyone in a similar way in order to facilitate feelings of fairness and procedural 
justice. What is perceived as effectively a two tiered tax system has undermined this 
neutrality. This could have grave consequences for the tax system. If people believe that 
the wealthy are evading and avoiding their taxes, or if the state seems to favour one group 
over the other, then compliance will become more problematic and the legitimacy of the 
system will be imperilled. As Daunton (2001, p. 15) observes: 
 
The political and economic dimensions of tax collection could work with each other 
to create a virtuous circle of trust, or against each other in a downward spiral of 
tension.  
 
However, trust in either the Tax Office and the tax system has not been completely 
dissolved by economic restructuring and globalisation resulting in the perception that the 
tax system unfairly favours the wealthy. The fact that people still believe that compliance 
with the tax system is an important social responsibility and that it should be fair despite its 
imperfections can be read as a critique of the time lag between policy elasticity 
responsiveness and socio-economic transformation, rather than evidence of wholesale 
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disengagement from the system. And the persistence of trust in the Australian tax system 
(even if couched in terms of future normative ideals of fairness, while recognising an 
unfair present) may well insure that this time lag is eventually bridged, provided 
mechanisms to restore a sense of fairness and balance are found. These will ultimately 
have to be made at a political level. The realisation of a sense of fairness through a restored 
sense of neutrality and deliberative arbitration may no longer be the preserve of any one 
nation-state however. Just as globalisation has selectively dissolved borders to commerce, 
finance and communication so to has it undermined the capacity of a state to contain its 
own tax revenues. In due course, policies that aim to restore fairness and balance to 
revenue authorities and tax systems may well require translational accords, multilateral 
initiatives and international cooperation. These measures may well be the only way to 
reassure the sceptical outlook of vigilant voices that still echo the call for a citizenship that 
does not differentiate people according to sectoral group interests but rather recognises 
everyone as taxpayers, with inputs matching outputs for all who weave the fabric of 
society. 
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